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Abstract. Ubiquitous devices comprising several resource-constrained
sensors and actuators while having the long desired Internet connectivity,
are becoming part of many solutions that seek to enhance user’s environ-
ment smartness and quality of living. Their intrinsic resource limitations
however constitute critical requirements, such as security, a great chal-
lenge. When these nodes are associated with applications that might have
an impact in user’s privacy or even become life threatening, the security
issues are of primary concern. Access to these resources should be ap-
propriately controlled to ensure that such wearable nodes are adequately
protected. On the other hand, it is very important to not restrict access to
only a very closed group of entities. This work presents a service oriented
architecture that utilizes policy-based, unified, cross-platform and flex-
ible access control to allow authenticated entities consume the services
provided by wearable nodes while protecting their valuable resources.
Keywords: Body sensor networks; policy-based access control; XACML;
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1 Introduction
In recent years, we have experienced a lot of innovation in the Internet of Things
(IoT) space. Collections of nodes typically bearing sensors and actuators are be-
coming part of a networking infrastructure and gain connectivity to the Internet.
The corresponding technologies are becoming mature enough to start looking
into more advanced and comprehensive solutions that can enable these nodes
to integrate smoothly with existing infrastructures while, however, expanding
existing attack surfaces.
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There are many application areas where these nodes flourish with even more
being introduced to take advantage of the services that they can offer. They
can be deployed as standalone nodes serving a single purpose, or as part of an
infrastructure that consists of nodes with similar characteristics comprising a so
called low power and lossy network (LLN). The current trend for all these nodes
characterised by their limited resources in terms of computing power, memory,
storage space and energy, is to adopt existing networking technologies and be
reachable over the Internet, abandoning proprietary closed solutions.
Sensor nodes and Service Oriented Architectures (SOAs) have become con-
vergent technologies with several standards emerging from these efforts. SOAs
evolved from the need to have interoperable, cross-platform, cross-domain and
network-agnostic access to devices and their services. At the same time, studies
[1] and published reports5 reveal that current deployments have not adequately
considered the threats that these nodes face when connected to the Internet,
hence the lack of the security measures. Such negligence is bound to inhibit
any efforts made towards using these pervasive devices to handle our personal
sensitive data. The expanded attack surface that results from the integration of
LLNs with the Internet, needs new or adapted mechanisms to mitigate these
new threats.
This paper defines an architecture that controls access to services provided
by resource-limited nodes. Among the main concerns of the proposed architec-
ture are the nodes’ protection from unauthorised and unjustifiable use of their
resources and the need to be able to control access through a well-established
set of policy rules that can change and adapt to new environmental parame-
ters. The work builds upon the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) reference model for policy based access control infrastructures and
proposes certain modifications to provide flexibility in terms of the authentica-
tion mechanism being used and satisfy requirements stemming from the limited
resources of nodes.
2 Background and related work
Standardisation and research efforts in the area of Service Oriented Architec-
tures have been taking place for more than a decade. Several schemes have been
proposed and standardised regarding service discovery, registration, access and
protection, and the corresponding communication protocols that enable the in-
teroperable exchange of messages among remote participating entities.
In terms of the way that access to web services is controlled, the eXtensi-
ble Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [2], provides an access control
language and a model for processing requests to resources while the Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) focuses on the way the requester is au-
thenticated and assertions are being transferred among participating entities.
WS-Trust is another web services oriented that defines how security tokens are
5 http://fortifyprotect.com/HP_IoT_Research_Study.pdf
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being issued, renewed and validated (WS-Trust). This paper focuses more on the
area of securing access to resources through policy-based access control, hence
it is related and utilises these security related standards mentioned above, while
proposing certain modifications mentioned below to fit best to the restricted
environment of LLNs.
Many access control schemes have been proposed for wireless sensor net-
works, yet most of them focus on authentication and authorization schemes
and on enhancing basic access control models to address privacy matters. Such
schemes can be found in [3–6]. Little work has been carried out on policy-based
access control (PBAC). The EU-project Internet-of-Things Architecture (IoT-A)
worked on the adoption of XACML in the Internet of Things [7] and proposed
a generic model whose functional modules are mapped to a set of well-defined
components that comprise the IoT-A. The authors use a logistics scenario for
demonstration purposes.
In [8] the authors also utilize XACML but focus on the privacy of e-Health
data within the mobile environment. In contrast to the work presented here, a
complete framework is not included and, moreover, the authors choose compu-
tationally intensive security mechanisms such as XML encryption digital signa-
tures. In [9], the authors propose a lightweight policy system for body sensors
but they do so by presenting a custom API and policy definitions, thus sacrificing
interoperability with existing standards and infrastructures.
3 Requirements
IP based networking in LLNs changes the way that participating nodes can be
accessed and their respective services can be consumed. For instance, there is no
need for a dedicated application server that will intervene between a node and a
remote party that wants to access the node’s resources [10]. However, one of the
problems that these nodes face in such a deployment, is that they have limited
resources which do not suffice for the deployment of strong protection mecha-
nisms. Without those mechanisms however, nodes are exposed to direct access
from the Internet without having the capacity to handle unlimited requests.
Therefore, several issues arise regarding the protection of nodes resources, that
have to be addressed. The main aim is to protect the limited resources of a node
that implements a service oriented architecture, to provide access to data and
mechanisms that the node has under control. In this paper we are looking at
these issues aiming for a smooth integration of web-services technology, adopted
by serving nodes, with the Web.
Within this context, the proposed architecture is designed to satisfy the fol-
lowing requirements:
– Provide services using of Service Oriented Architecture technologies;
– Provide fine-grained access control to nodes’ resources;
– Authenticate remote entities wishing to access protected nodes resources;
– Control access to nodes’ resources through well-defined policies;
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– Protect sensitive nodes from unauthorised access and unnecessary consump-
tion of valuable resources including network and energy;
– Comply with existing standards to satisfy interoperability among the partici-
pating entities, such as between the identity provider chosen by the requester
and the service orchestrator, regarding the exchange of authentication mes-
sages, assertions or user metadata and attributes.
In the following section we describe the proposed architecture that satisfies
the above.
4 Proposed Architecture
The architecture proposed in this paper is an enhanced policy based access con-
trol scheme that seeks to provide flexibility regarding the chosen authentication
mechanism while satisfying the aforementioned requirements, typically imposed
by nodes’ resource limitations. For this purpose, certain modifications to the
OASIS standardised policy-based access control scheme are proposed to accom-
modate these needs.
The scheme utilizes and seeks compliance with the following technologies:
– XACML: an XML-based OASIS standard that defines a policy and an access
control decision request/response language. An XACML-based architecture
typically consists of the following main components:
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Performs access control, by making
decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions [2, 11].
• Policy Decision Point (PDP): Evaluates requests against applicable poli-
cies and renders an authorization decision [2].
• Policy Administration Point (PAP): Creates and manages policies or
policy sets [2].
• Policy Information Point (PIP): Acts as a source of attribute values [2].
– SAML 2.0 specification to protect, transport, and request XACML schema
instances and other information needed by an XACML implementation [12].
In the XACML data-flow model the PEP, via the context handler, is con-
sidered as the device that orchestrates the exchange of messages among the
requester, the PDP, the Attribute Authority and the Attribute Repository. Ac-
cording to the XACML specifications the PEP is considered as “part of a remote-
access gateway, part of a Web server or part of an email user-agent, etc”. There-
fore all initial requests, valid or not, are sent to the PEP which will act as a
routing device between the requester and the back-end key entities that exam-
ine the requests and make decision based on policy rules and other parameters,
such as the requester’s and/or resource’s attributes.
While this model is appropriate for typical application gateways, it cannot be
considered as such for resource-constrained nodes that only have the capacity to
accept requests from a limited number of clients. Beyond this threshold, valuable
node resource consumption is not acceptable as it leads to battery drainage
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and service unavailability. In this context, resource-constrained devices have to
participate in the decision making process only if absolutely necessary and only
to authorized entities to save valuable resources. As such, they cannot assume
the role of a PEP as this is defined in the XACML standard [2].
Moreover, the flow model currently defined by XACML, considers that the
PIP has all the required attributes for the requester, and that the PDP gets all
the information from the PIP, which might be queried twice for the required
attributes, once from the PEP and once from the PDP. Use of specific PIP
implies that services will only be provided to entities subscribed to the specific
scheme, thus narrowing down flexibility. This is in contrast to a more flexible
approach where services are offered to a broader group of users, subject to policy
restrictions.
The proposed architecture is depicted in Figure 1. In this proposal we assume
that nodes bearing sensor and actuators, expose their functionality as web ser-
vices. This can either be done through the device that the node is attached to,
e.g. a mobile device, or directly by the node, assuming that it is powerful enough
to accommodate such functionality. All these nodes are part of a dispersed envi-
ronment where there is not necessarily a single gateway or web server to assume
the role of PEP as this is defined in the XACML standard. Besides that, the
service owner might want to register these services with multiple servers. As a
result, the PEP functionality cannot be assigned to a gateway but it should be
on the device that exposes this functionality, i.e. the mobile device or the mi-
cro/power node. For a given PEP, one of these web servers is assumed to play
the role of the orchestrator as described below.
Fig. 1. Authenticated Access Control for LLNs
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The core component of the proposed scheme is the Service Orchestrator (SO)
which acts as a proxy for certain operations, such as relaying queries and mes-
sages exchanged among participating entities, yet not for handling the informa-
tion the PEP exchanges with the requester.
Initially, the node, which assumes the role of a PEP, registers its services,
defines the connection point to be the SO and sets the policy rules for its re-
sources. This is accomplished once during the set-up phase. Following that, the
data flow of the proposed architecture includes the following steps:
– A requester, who wants to access the service, formulates an appropriate
request based on the advertised service rules, and sends it to the SO (step
1a). Note that this is in contrast to the XACML specifications which opted
for sending the request directly to the PEP, introducing significant overhead
that a limited-resources device cannot handle.
– The SO forwards the request to the PDP (step 1b) which, based on the
requested target, fetches all applicable policies from the PAP (step 2) and
informs the SO about the needed user attributes (step 3). As a result, the
SO presents a list of approved Identity Providers (IdP) for the requester to
authenticate (step 4).
– The requester chooses the appropriate IdP and the SO issues a (signed)
authentication request (<AuthnRequest>) together with an attribute query
(<AttributeQuery>) [12] to the chosen IdP. Upon successful authentication
(step 5) the requester consents for the disclosure of certain attributes that
the SO requires. Note that the IdP might be an entity that operates within
the same environment as the SO. The authentication method used by the
IdP is outside the scope of this paper.
– The IdP formulates a proper assertion for the necessary attributes and sends
it to the SO via the Requester (step 6a). As a result, the SO forwards the
received assertion to the PDP (Step 6b) [13].
– The forwarded assertion allows the PDP to establish a security context by
combining the supplied attributes with the applicable policy rules which the
PDP obtained from the PAP (step 2). Note that additional policy rules,
might be obtained at this point (step 7), based on the requestes’ attributes.
The typical XACML decision making process can take place during this step.
– The access decision is sent to the SO (step 8). If the decision is to grant
access, a signed or MAC-protected ticket is forwarded to the PEP together
with details about the request (step 9). This is the first time that the node is
contacted, and is only performed by an authorized party, hence not exposed
to the outside world. If access is denied the decision is simply forwarded to
the Requester. The Service Provider might also be informed on that based
on appropriate pre-configurations.
– Now the PEP can respond to the service request through the SO (step 10).
The SO can in turn send to the requester the Access Decision and the re-
sponse to the Access Request. The Access Decision can be used as a token for
re-accessing the same service without undergoing the authentication process.
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5 Implementation Approach
There are many open-source implementations of the XACML handling and
decision-making process that can be utilized for the proposed architecture. The
authors chose Suns XACML [14] for this implementation, as it remains popular
among developers and is actually the basis of various current open source and
commercial offerings.
All of the frameworks entities are implemented using DPWS. This facilitates
the discovery and description of the devices involved, and also offers control
and eventing mechanisms which assist in the communication of the necessary
information among the entities. Web Services for Devices (WS4D) [15] is an
open source initiative which provides a number of toolkits for various platforms.
The authors APIs of choice is the WS4D-JMEDS (Java-based) [16] stack as it is
the most advanced and active work of the WS4D initiative, supporting almost
all of the existing DPWS features and providing portability to a wide range of
platforms.
The exact implementation of the frameworks entities and their communica-
tion interfaces are detailed below.
Service Orchestrator to Policy Decision Point The SO is implemented
as a DPWS peer (i.e. both a client and a server). Other than the necessary
mechanisms needed to interface with the approved identity providers (which
will vary depending on the specific scenario/deployment examined), it also fea-
tures an “Attribute Requirements operation. Similarly, the PDP has an “Ac-
cess Request Operation. The latter is invoked by the SO as soon as an access
request arrives from a service consumer, relaying the request for evaluation. As
soon as the XACML decision-making process is completed, the PDP replies to
the invocation with its access decision. As detailed in the information flow above,
prior to providing a decision, it may need to invoke the “Attribute Requirements
operation on the SO, in order to inform it of the needed user attributes, getting
the proper assertion as an answer.
Service Orchestrator to Policy Enforcement Point The Policy Enforce-
ment Point must reside on every device with resources that must be protected
from unauthorized access. Other than the functional elements of the devices
which the framework intends to protect (e.g. access to its sensors), one extra op-
eration must be present on each DPWS device, namely the PEP Operation. The
SO, acting as a client, invokes this operation providing the service consumers
access request along with the decision (pre-issued by the PDP) as input. If the
decision accompanying the invocation is positive, the PEP replies to the SO with
the resource (e.g. temperature reading) that the service consumer originally tried
to access. This information is then relayed to the service consumer/requester.
The above DPWS-based communication mechanisms are depicted in the figure
below.
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Fig. 2. DPWS-based implementation of the authentication scheme
6 Security Analysis
One of the main concerns in accessing services and issuing commands, is the
protection of the data being exchanged among the participating entities. In the
proposed scheme the service provider has a pre-established relationship with the
SO, PDP and PAP. Note that all these three entities are only functional compo-
nents and therefore the exact needs in secure channel establishment depend on
the actual deployment choice and cannot be specified. In a simplified approach,
the SO, PDP and PAP can be part of the same entity and therefore a secure
channel establishment using pre-shared keys is a viable and efficient option.
Regarding the underlying message security mechanisms, common methods
that provide end-to-end security like TLS [17], (Transport Layer Security) [17]
protocol and its counterpart proposed for securing UDP messages, namely DTLS
[18], are considered suitable for this architecture. The cost of using TLS however,
between the Requester and the SO is that the secure channel breaks at the SO
and the SO has to re-encrypt the communication using the security parameters
set for the link between the SO and the service provider. At the network layer
solutions like the IPsec protocol and its variants that utilize header compression
[19–21] can provide similar levels of protection. An alternative approach would
be to utilize a subset of the mechanisms detailed in the WS-Security [22] spec-
ification, but the X509-based public key schemes included in said specification
can impose a significant performance overhead [23].
7 Conclusions
As computing becomes ubiquitous, researchers and engineers aim to exploit the
potential of pervasive systems, including nodes with sensors and actuators in-
terconnected via LLNs, in order to introduce new types of services and address
inveterate and emerging problems. Nevertheless, a key factor in the wide adop-
tion and success of these new technologies will be the effectiveness with which
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the various security and privacy concerns are tackled. A necessary instrument
in successfully addressing said issues is the presence of robust access control
mechanisms.
To this end, this paper presents a work in progress on an architecture for
providing access control services to heterogeneous resource-constrained devices.
The authors chose the use of standardized access control mechanisms based on
XACML. Moreover, the core PEP functionality is separated from the rest of
the network and the decision-making process, keeping the core resource pro-
vision with the device that has the resources, while relieving it from the addi-
tional essential, yet very heavy computations that the XACML standard defines.
Moreover, this approach shelters the device from direct user interaction, helping
alleviate concerns that are typical to resource-constrained devices, like Denial of
Service attacks.
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